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MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE FIGHT 




From the Sahel-Sahara region to Afghanistan, from Syria to the Philippines, the international 
community has been witnessing, for a number of years now, the establishment of military training 
and support partnerships, the launch of joint military operations and the formation of international 
coalitions which have had a recent upsurge, all of these having been specifically designed to fight 
against and eliminate the terrorist scourge. These different forms of military cooperation have been 
justified either by a consent or request from the territorial State, by the right of self-defense, 
or even by an authorization from the UN Security Council. This article’s purpose is to analyze 
the legal framework within which the operations must fall in order for them to be lawful and 
their justifications to be valid. Through the analysis of doctrinal debates, actual State practice and 
the decisions of the International Court of Justice, this paper examines notably the criteria that make 
an intervention by invitation valid, the limitative conditions of invocation and implementation of the 
right of self-defense, and finally the original as well as the current mechanism of collective security 
that has led to the establishment of peace or multilateral operations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For years, terrorism has become a serious concern to the inter-
national community. In order to prevent and eradicate this scourge that 
threatens international peace and security, States have been called upon 
for cooperation. International cooperation against terrorism is charac-
terized by the implementation of a wide array of measures addressed 
by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Strategy (e.g. education, law 
enforcement, judicial cooperation, sanctions, and capacity building). 
This paper does not intend to address all the different types of coopera-
tion but rather to focus on a specific one, namely the military coop-
eration among States while combating terrorism. Military cooperation 
among members of the international community takes different forms 
ranging from training national forces of other countries, sharing intelli-
gence, to launching joint combat operations against terrorists harbored 
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in the territory of a third State.
The military operations launched in the context of the fight against 
terrorism are not left to the sole discretion of the States. On the con-
trary they are governed by international law, and, very often, by the jus 
contra bellum which is a legal regime consisting of a fundamental prin-
ciple enshrined in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter – the pro-
hibition of the use of force in the international relations between States 
– and of two confirmed and recognized exceptions that are the right 
of self-defense and the use of force authorized by the UN Security 
Council. Therefore, in order to determine whether the different forms 
of military cooperation against terrorism fall within the framework of 
the jus contra bellum, it is necessary to clarify the content and scope of 
the principle (I) and its two exceptions (II).
II. THE PRINCIPLE PROHIBITING HTE USE OF FORCE
Since 1945 at least, international law has been proscribing the threat 
or use of force in the international relations between States. This fun-
damental principle prohibiting the use of force is enshrined in Article 
2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter which provides that “[a]ll Members 
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the Unit-
ed Nations.” As this provision “constitutes the basis of any discussion 
of the problem of the use of force”1, a clarification of its terms seems 
therefore required. Following on, it will be stressed that some forms 
of military cooperation, when based on a valid consent of the territo-
rial State, do not fall within the ambit of the jus contra bellum.
A. CONTENT AND SCOPE OF THE PRINCIPLE: AN OVERVIEW
The notion of ‘force’ has created some debates. However, the pre-
vailing view is that the term must be limited to the notion of direct or 
indirect ‘armed force’ and does not comprise other forms of force like, 
1 Albrecht Randelzhofer, ‘Article 2(4)’, in: Brunno Simma (ed.), The Charter of the 
United Nations, A Commentary, vol. I, Munich, C.H. Beck, 2002, at 116.
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for example, political and economic coercion2. Indeed, in the Declara-
tion on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co- operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, a document annexed to Resolution 2625 (XXV) of the 
General Assembly which contains an interpretation of the fundamental 
principles of the UN Charter, the section dealing with the prohibition 
of force only refers to the notion of armed or military force. The 
other forms of force, such as the economic and political coercion, are 
covered by the section dealing with the principle of non-intervention3. 
Moreover, in order to be qualified as a ‘use of force’ under Article 2, 
paragraph 4, a military operation must affect the territory, people or 
objects placed under the jurisdiction of another State4. Indeed, the mere 
non authorized flights by foreign military aircrafts over the airspace of 
a third State are, in general, qualified as a violation of the sovereignty 
of the territorial sovereign but not a violation of the principle embod-
ied in the paragraph 45.
Furthermore, the wording ‘international relations’ means that the 
threat or use of force proscribed by Article 2, paragraph 4, of the 
UN Charter is limited to the international relations between States. In 
other words, the jus contra bellum is essentially an inter-State regime 
proscribing military coercion by a State against another one, in viola-
tion of the sovereignty of the latter6.
Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter also provides that States shall 
2 See notably Hans Wehberg, ‘L’interdiction du recours à la force. Le principe et les 
problèmes qui se posent’, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International 
Law, t. 78, 1951, at 69 [hereinafter Collected Courses…] ; Dereck W. Bowett, Self-
Defence in International Law, Manchester, Manchester University Press,
1958, at 148 ; Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Ox-
ford, Clarendon Press, 1963, at 362.
3 For other reasons in favor of a restrictive interpretation of the notion of force, see 
notably Eric Corthay, La lutte contre le terrorisme international, De la licéité du 
recours à la force armée, Bâle, Helbing Lichtenhahn,
2012, at 37-38, Albrecht Randelzhofer, supra note 1, at 118.
4 Ian Brownlie, supra note 2, at 363-364; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, public sitting, 15 June 
1998, Fisheries Jurisdictions (Spain v. Canada), CR 1998/13, at 59, para. 22.
5 Ian Brownlie, ibid.
6 Olivier Corten, The Law Against War, The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Con-
temporary International Law, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2012, 
at 169.
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refrain from the threat or use of force “against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any State, or in any other manner incon-
sistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”. Following a narrow 
interpretation of the provision, some scholars argue that the principle 
prohibiting the use of force is infringed only when a military opera-
tion intends to overthrow a foreign government or annex a foreign 
territory7. In their opinion, therefore, targeted killings, rescue opera-
tions, as well as the bombardment of terrorists’ training camps abroad 
would not be prohibited by the principle8. Such a view, however, must 
be rejected. At the Conference of San Francisco in 1945 the terms ‘ter-
ritorial integrity’ and ‘political independence’ have not been included 
in the paragraph 4 to restrict the scope of the prohibition of the use of 
force, but rather to emphasize the need to protect these two core 
elements of statehood9. According to the predominant opinion, the 
principle in question proscribes any kind of forcible trespassing that 
violates international frontiers and State sovereignties10. The term ‘ter-
ritorial integrity’ must be read as ‘territorial inviolability’11 or inviola-
bility of frontiers, and the ‘political independence’ of a State – defined 
as the right of a State to exercise its internal and international political 
sovereignty without outside interference – is deemed to be immediately 
infringed when a foreign military action is conducted without the au-
thorization of the territorial State, even if that action does not result in 
7 See notably Dereck W. Bowett, supra note 2, at 152 and 186 ; Rosalyn Higgins, 
‘The Legal Limits to the Use of Force by Sovereign States : United Nations Practice’, 
BYIL, vol. 37, 1961, at 317.
8 See notably Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave : Law and Foreign Policy, New 
York, Columbia University Press, 2nd ed., 1979, at 141-145 ; Gregory M. Travalio, 
‘Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military Force’, Wisconsin Int’l L.J., 
vol. 18, 2000, at 166 ; Jordan J. Paust, ‘Use of Armed Force against Terrorists in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond’, Cornell Int’l L.J., vol. 35, num. 3, 2002, at 536.
9 See declarations of Honduras, Egypt, New Zealand, Ethiopia, Bolivia, UNCIO, 
1945, vol. IV.
10 See notably Humphrey Waldock, ‘The Regulation of the Use of Force by Indi-
vidual States in International Law’, Collected Courses…, t. 81, 1952-II, at 493 ; Ian 
Brownlie, supra note 2, at 267 ; Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, ‘International Law 
in the Past Third of a Century’, Collected Courses…, t. 159, 1978-I, at 89-92.
11 This expression is notably used by Lassa F. L. Oppenheim, International Law : a 
Treatise, vol. 2, Disputes, War and Neutrality, 7th ed., H. Lauterpacht (ed.), London, 
New York, Longmans Green, 1952, at 154.
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overthrowing the government of the said State12.
Finally, one must be clearly reminded that Article 2, paragraph 4, 
in fine (“[…] or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations”) is not intended to restrict but, on the contrary, 
to strengthen a general and comprehensive prohibition of force in the 
international relations between States13. As stated by the delegate of 
the United States during the travaux préparatoires of the UN Charter 
in 1945, “the intention of the authors of the original text was to state 
in the broadest terms an absolute all-inclusive prohibition; the phrase 
‘or in any other manner’ was designed to ensure that there should be no 
loopholes”14.
B. MILITARY COOPERATION NOT FALLING WITHIN THE AM-
BIT OF THE JUS CONTRA BELLUM
Some forms of military cooperation do not fall within the ambit 
of the regime of the jus contra bellum as defined supra. In the context 
of the fight against terrorism, one might indicate at least two types of 
cooperation not covered by that regime. The first one is the advisory 
support, training and supply of military equipment by one State on the 
request of another one. This scenario has been exemplified when, 
under the framework of an annual joint exercise, Balikatan 02-1, 
US military advisors trained Philippine Armed Forces in anti terrorist 
tactics and intelligence gathering techniques15. Another example is the 
supply of military equipment to the Kurds in northern Iraq, in the past 
few months, by an emerging coalition of States, including notably the 
United States, Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy16. This sup-
12 Eric Corthay, supra note 3, at 57-58.
13 See notably Hans Wehberg, supra note 2, at 70 ; Quincy Wright, ‘The Outlawry of 
War and the Law of War’, AJIL, vol. 47, num. 3, 1953, at 370 ; Ian Brownlie, ‘The 
Use of Force in Self-Defence’, BYIL, vol. 37, 1961, at 236 ; Albrecht Randelzhofer, 
supra note 1, at 123.
14 UNCLOS, 1945, vol. VI, at 335. See also the proposed amendments made by 
Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica and Iran, at 557-563.
15 Wayne A. Larsen, Beyond Al Qaeda: Islamic Terror in South East Asia, Maxwell 
Air Force Base, Alabama, 2005, at 26.
16 On September 10, 2014, President Obama announced the support to Iraqi and 
Kurdish forces with training, intelligence and equipment, and highlighted that 
allies were already sending arms and assistance to Iraqi security forces. See 
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port, given with the consent of Iraq’s central government, aims at 
aiding Kurds in their battle against militants of the Islamic State in Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL), stopping their expansion throughout the country, 
protecting civilians, and avoiding a destabilization of the region17.
The second type of cooperation concerns the combat operations 
against non-state actors with the request or consent of the host State. 
This is notably the case of the current air campaign against ISIL con-
ducted by a coalition of States (US, France, UK and others) on the 
request of the Iraqi government and with the help of Iraqi security 
forces on the ground gathering intelligence18. Another example is the 
French Operation Barkhane, launched in August 2014 on the basis of 
defense agreements, which consists in securing the Sahel-Sahara region 
by supporting G-5 Sahel troops (Chad, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and 
Mauritania) and preventing the setting up of terrorist sanctuaries19.
Statement by the President on ISIL, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press- office/2014/09/10/remarks-president-barack-obama-address-nation. As well, 
Iranian forces are helping the Iraqi army on the ground, providing weapons, intel-
ligence and advisors, see Kate Brannen, ‘Teheran’s Boots on the Gound’, Foreign 
Policy, 10 September 2014, available at: http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/ 
2014/09/10/tehraboots_on_the_ground_iraq_syria_islamic_state_isis _iran. Also, in 
September, Saudi Arabia gave the green light for the US Request for an anti-ISIS 
training program, see Foreign Policy, available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2014/09/11/fps_situation_report_obama_lays_out_plan_475_more_troop 
s_for_iraq_but_no_boots_o.
17 EurActive.de, ‘Merkel defends decision to arm Iraqi Kurds with German weap-
ons’, 2 September 2014, available at: http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-eu-
rope/merkel-defends-decision-arm-iraqi-kurds-german- weapons-308148.
18 Karen De Young, ‘Obama approves deployment of 350 more troops to Iraq’, 
The Washington Post, 2 September 2014, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/obama-approves- deployment-of-350-more-troops-
to-iraq/2014/09/02/b05aa99a-3306-11e4-a723-fa3895a25d02_story.html. Christo-
pher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, ‘A broad approach to countering the Islamic State’, The 
Washington Post, 2 September 2014, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/02/a-broad- approach-to-countering-the-islamic- 
state/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=%2AMideast%20
Brief&utm_campaign=2014_T he%20Middle%20East%20Daily_9.3.14. It is also 
said that Iranian forces are helping the Iraqi army on the ground in conducting joint 
operations against ISIL
19 For more information, see the French Minister of Defense’s website, in: www.
defense.gouv.fr; see also Andrew McGregor, ‘Operation Barkhane: France’s New 
Military Approach to Counter-Terrorism in Africa’, TerrorismMonitor, vol. XII, issue 
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It goes without saying that consented military training and supply 
of military equipment per se do not constitute any violation of Article 
2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter, as no ‘resort to force’ occurs in 
casu. Moreover, combat missions by foreign troops on the territory of 
another State, with the consent or on the request of the latter, must be 
considered as interventions by invitation and as such are legal. Indeed, 
it is not contested that consent may justify a military operation by one 
State in the territory of another one. In its Resolution 387 (1976), for 
example, the Security Council recalled “the inherent and lawful right 
of every State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, to request assistance 
from any other State or group of States”. Intervention by invitation 
must not be considered as an exception to the principle prohibiting the 
use of force. Neither must consent be considered as a circumstance 
excluding the wrongfulness of a military operation20. Indeed, for con-
sent to be valid, it must be given ex ante facto. The resulting operation 
consented to does not constitute, as such, a violation of the principle, 
and therefore, as there is no breach of an international obligation, no 
wrongful act occurs and consequently no wrongfulness that consent can 
preclude21.
Consent justifies a military operation by one State in the territory 
of another only if it is valid. In the light of State practice, it can be af-
firmed that its validity depends upon several criteria. Firstly, consent 
must be internationally attributable to a State, i.e. “it must emanate 
from an organ whose will is deemed, at the international level, to be 
the will of the State”22. Secondly, as already pointed out supra, con-
sent must be given by the territorial State prior to the commission of 
15, 25 July, 2014, at 3-4
20 See, with regard to the circumstances precluding wrongfulness, Resolution 56/83 
of 12 December 2001 in which the General Assembly took note of the Draft Ar-
ticles on Responsibility of States for internationally Wrongful Acts [hereinafter ILC 
Articles].
21 Roberto Ago, ‘Eighth report on State responsibility: The internationally wrongful 
act of the State, source of international responsibility’, Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, Vol. II, Part One, 1979, at 30, para. 55 [hereinafter Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n].
22 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-first session, 14 
May – 3 August 1979, Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, Vol. II, Part Two, 1979, at 113, para. 15.
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the act23. Thirdly, consent must be given freely; i.e. “consent must not 
be vitiated by ‘defects’ such as error, fraud, corruption or coercion”24. 
Fourthly, consent must be clearly established and not presumed25. In 
addition, it should be noted that a particular act, which otherwise would 
have been considered as a breach of an international obligation, is law-
ful only if conducted “within the limits which the State expressing 
the consent intends with respect to its scope and duration”26. Therefore, 
as long as these criteria are fulfilled, one might consider that the con-
sent given by the States mentioned supra (e.g. Iraq, Sahel countries) 
are valid. Consequently, the foreign military operations carried out in 
their territory are not in breach of the principle embodied in Article 2, 
paragraph 4, of the Charter.
III. THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLE PROHIBITING THE 
USE OF FORCE
For years, several counter-terrorism military operations, some-
times carried out by a coalition of States, have been conducted in 
different places in the World. All of these operations have been 
justified by either of the two exceptions to the principle of non resort to 
force, i.e. the right of self-defense (1), or an authorization given by the 
Security Council (2). The following paragraphs aim at clarifying the 
content and scope of these two exceptions in order to assess the legality 
of the operations.
A. THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE
An example of the call for international cooperation in the context 
of the fight against terrorism occurred in the aftermath of the 9/11 ter-
rorist attacks. On 20 September 2001, President George W. Bush said: 
“[w]e ask every nation to join us” in the fight against terror27. On 
10 November 2001, before the General Assembly, he also stated that 
23 Ibid., at 113, para. 16.
24 Ibid., at 112, para. 12.
25 Ibid., at 112, para. 14
26 Ibid., at 113, para. 17.
27 President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and American 
People, 20 September 2001, available at: http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speech-
es/gwbush911jointsessionspeech.htm
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“[t]he conspiracies of terror are being answered by an expanding 
global coalition. […] We are asking for a comprehensive commit-
ment to this fight. We must unite in opposing all terrorists […]”28. A 
large majority of States responded positively to that appeal. It must be 
mentioned that the United States left them with little choice but to co-
operate. Indeed, President Bush clearly stated: “[e]very nation, in every 
region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are 
with the terrorists”.29 The support of the international community was 
manifold: politically, financially, and sometimes militarily30.
Military cooperation against Al-Qaida and the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan is illustrated by the joint US and UK Operation Enduring 
Freedom which was launched on October 2, 2001, and justified through 
the right of self-defense. Indeed, in the letter addressed to the President 
of the Security Council, the US Permanent Representative to the Unit-
ed Nations, John D. Negroponte, declared that “the United States 
of America, together with other States, has initiated actions in the 
exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defence 
following the armed attacks that were carried out against the United 
States on 11 September 2001”31. Many other cooperating nations did 
not operate in front line missions on the ground, but merely provided 
air, sea and land support (e.g. bases, territorial access, and overflight 
permission) to countries engaged in offensive missions in Afghanistan.
More recently, on September 23, 2014, the United States and an 
array of Arab allies launched airstrikes in Syria against ISIL and Al-
Qaida targets which pose terrorist threats to the US and its allies. These 
strikes have also been justified by the right of self-defense. In her letter 
to the UN Secretary-General, the US Permanent Representative, Sa-
mantha J. Power, declared: “States must be able to defend themselves, 
in accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective self-
28 UN Doc. A/56/PV.44, at 8 and 9.
29 President George W. Bush, supra note 27.
30 See declarations of States before the General Assembly at the 44th plenary meeting, 
10 to 16 November 2001, UN Doc. A/56/PV.44 to A/56/PV.57.
31 UN Doc. S/2001/946. See also the letter dated 7 October 2001 from the 
Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of 
the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2001/947.
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defense, as reflected in Article 51 of the UN Charter, when, as is the 
case here, the government of the State where the threat is located is 
unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory for such attacks. 
The Syrian regime has shown that it cannot and will not confront these 
safe-havens effectively itself”.32
In the opinion of the present writer, Operation Enduring Freedom 
in Afghanistan and the airstrikes in Syria do not comply with the law 
de lege lata, and, in particular, with the customary law of self-defense 
enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. This Article requires: 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of in-
dividual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations”. Taking into consideration scholarly 
works, international jurisprudence and State practice, it will be shown 
infra that the right of self-defense can only be invoked in the case 
of ongoing armed attack by a State33. As the conditions of invocation 
(armed attack by a State) and implementation (ongoing armed attack) 
of the right of self-defense have not been met, the two military opera-
tions could not and should not have been justified by that right.
1. The conditions of invocation of the right of self-defense
the requirement for an armed attack to exist was confirmed in the 
Nicaragua case by the International Court of Justice which held that 
such an attack is “the condition sine qua non required for the exercise 
of the right of […] self-defence”34. The question as to whether a 
particular use of force may be qualified as an armed attack depends 
upon the degree of gravity of the said act. Indeed, in the Nicaragua 
case, the Court held: “As regards certain particular aspects of the prin-
ciple [prohibiting the use of force], it will be necessary to distinguish 
the most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed 
attack) from other less grave forms.”35 In order to determine whether 
32 See the letter available at: http://justsecurity.org/15436/war-powers-resolution-
article-51-letters-force-syria- isil-khorasan-group/.
33 Eric Corthay, supra note 3, at 93.
34 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. Unit-
ed States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, para. 237 [hereinafter 
Nicaragua case]. See also, Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States 
of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2003, para. 51 [hereinafter Oil Platforms case].
35 Nicaragua case, para. 191.
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the degree of gravity necessary for an armed attack has been reached, 
the scale and effect of the attack need to be analyzed.36
Terrorist attacks, as those perpetrated in New York (2001) or Bali 
(2002), show that non- state actors are capable of severely endangering 
national and international peace and security with, at the very least, 
the same degree of effectiveness and horror as the conduct of any con-
ventional armed attack by States. Therefore, some scholars and certain 
members of the international community assert that an armed attack 
giving rise to the right of self-defense can be carried out by individu-
als or groups of individuals even when those entities have no suffi-�
cient connection with a State for attributing their violent conduct to that 
State.37 However, many scholars, to which one subscribes, have seri-
ous reservations with regard to the opinion according to which the act 
that triggers a reaction in self-defense might be the conduct of a person 
or group of persons which is not attributed to a State.38
a. The jurisprudence of the international court of justice
 The International Court of Justice, which is the principal judicial 
organ of the United Nations and whose task is mainly to explain 
the state of international law on particular points at a specific mo-
ment, has recalled many times that an armed attack is and must be 
36 Ibid., para. 195.
37 See notably Humphrey Waldock, supra note 10, at 463-464, and 498; Dereck W. 
Bowett, supra note 2, at 55- 56; James E. S. Fawcett, ‘Intervention in International 
law. A Study of Some Recent Cases’, Collected Courses…, 1961-II, at 363; Ruth 
Wedgwood, ‘Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden’, Yale J.Int’l 
L., vol. 24, num. 2, 1999, at 564; Thomas M. Franck, ‘Terrorism and the Right of 
Self-Defense’, AJIL, vol. 95, num. 4, 2001, at 840; Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression 
and Self-Defence, 3rd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, at 192 and 
214, Jordan J. Paust, ‘Use of Armed Force against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, 
and Beyond’, Cornell Int’l L.J., vol. 35, num. 3, 2002, at 534.
38 See inter alia Joseph L. Kunz, ‘Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Ar-
ticle 51 of the Charter of the United Nations’, AJIL, vol. 41, num. 4, 1947, at 878; 
Hans Kelsen, ‘Collective Security and Collective Self- Defense under the Charter of 
the United Nations’, AJIL, vol. 42, num. 4, 1948, at 791; Eric P. J. Myjer, Nigel D. 
White, ‘The Twin Towers Attack : an Unlimited Right to Self-Defence ?’, JCSL, vol. 
7, 2002, at 7; Marcelo G. Kohen, ‘Is the Legal Argument for Self-Defence against 
Terrorism Correct ?’, in: Wybo P. Heere (ed.), From Government to Governance, 
The Growing Impact of Non-State Actors on the International and European Legal 
System, The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2003, at 290.
431Volume 12 Number 4 July 2015
Military Cooperation in the Fight Against Terrorism from the Standpoint of International Law
understood as being an act of State. For example39, in 1986, in the 
Nicaragua case, the Court linked and quasi assimilated the concept 
of armed attack mentioned under Article 51 of the UN Charter with 
the concept of aggression used in the Annex (Definition of Aggres-
sion) to the Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of the General Assembly40. 
Article I of the Annex defines the concept of aggression as “[…] 
the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territo-
rial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations”41. 
Almost twenty years later, in the Wall case, when answering the 
question whether the construction of a wall between Israel and Pal-
estine could be justified by the right of self-defense, the Court held 
that “Article 51 of the Charter […] recognizes the existence of an 
inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one 
State against another State.”42 However, as “Israel [did] not claim 
that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State” the Court 
concluded that Article 51 of the UN Charter had no relevance in this 
case43.
b. The opinion of the international law commission
 The International Law Commission, which is responsible for the 
codification and progressive development of international law, 
points out that the act which triggers an action in self-defense must 
be an internationally wrongful act, i.e. an act of State. Indeed, in the 
Addendum to the eighth report on State responsibility, Roberto 
Ago underlined that “the State takes action [in self-defense] after 
having suffered an international wrong, namely, the non-respect of 
one of its rights by the State against which the action in question is 
directed”44. Then, when clarifying the nature of the ‘wrong’, Ago 
39 See also as another example but not detailed here, Oil Platforms case, supra note 
34, paras. 51 and 61.
40 Nicaragua case, supra note 34, para. 195.
41 Emphasis added.
42 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, para. 139.
43 Ibid.
44 Roberto Ago, ‘Addendum to the eighth report on State responsibility: The interna-
tionally wrongful act of the State, source of international responsibility’, Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n, Vol. II, Part. One, 1980, at 54, para. 89.
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underscored that “the only international wrong which, exceptional-
ly, makes it permissible for the State to react against another State 
by recourse to force, despite the general ban on force, is an offence 
which itself constitutes a violation of the ban”45.
 When non-state actors launch an attack against a State from the 
territory of another one but their conduct is not attributed to any 
State, no internationally wrongful act is committed by them. In par-
ticular, no violation of the fundamental principle on the prohibition 
of the use of force, and consequently no armed attack in the mean-
ing of Article 51 can occur because the principle on the prohibition 
of the use of force applies only to States and in their relations with 
others. Therefore, according to Ago, in such a situation the victim 
State is not authorized to invoke the right of self-defense, although 
it is still lawful for that nation to take appropriate security measures 
within its territory in order to defend its citizens and maintain peace 
and security.
c. The rules of attribution
 For the reasons mentioned above, an armed attack is and can only be 
the conduct of a State. In other words, in order to assess if the 9/11 
terrorist attacks are susceptible to being referred to as an armed at-
tack, it is inter alia necessary to determine if that act is attributable 
to a State. To do that, the rules of attribution mentioned under Chap-
ter II of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts must be applied46. Chapter II specifies the limitative 
conditions under which a conduct is attributable to a State.
 With regard to Operation Enduring Freedom, none of these condi-
tions have been invoked by the United States or the United King-
dom to declare that the 9/11 attacks were attributable to a State. 
Indeed, not once did they contend that bin Laden and his group 
were de jure organs of a government (Art. 4), or that their conduct 
was carried out on the instructions or under the direction or control 
of a State (Art. 8), or that their actions had been acknowledged and 
adopted by State authorities ex post facto (Art. 11).
 Concerning the airstrikes in Syria against ISIL, some scholars and 
law practitioners hold the view that when a State is ‘unwilling or 
45 Ibid.
46 See ILC Articles, supra note 20.
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unable’ to prevent individuals from using its territory for launch-
ing terrorist attacks, it may be lawful for the targeted State – or 
other States in case of collective self-defense – to use force in self-
defense in order to address that threat47. This raises the question of 
whether a new condition of attribution has emerged, and more ex-
actly, whether failure to prevent or punish terrorist attacks conduct-
ed by non-state actors justifies inferring the host State’s complicity 
in the individuals’ acts, and consequently regarding the terrorist acts 
as the conduct of the host State.
i. The theory of complicity and the standard of due diligence
 According to the controversial theory of complicity invoked 
today by some scholars in the context of the fight against terror-
ism48, the actions carried out in the territory of the victim State 
by private entities residing in the territory of the host State are 
attributed to that latter State, not because the private entities 
would have acted on its behalf, on its instructions, or under its 
direction or control, but simply because the host State has failed 
to fulfill its ex ante facto duty of not tolerating, supporting or 
encouraging (e.g. funding, arming, training) the preparation in 
its territory of actions directed against the victim State, or its 
ex post facto duty of prosecuting and punishing or extraditing 
the offenders for their wrong49. In other words, States would 
be complicit and would be held responsible for the conduct of 
individuals when they fail to fulfill their international obliga-
tions of vigilance. Such an obligation can be broadly defined as 
a requirement for each State to protect other States, as well 
as the representatives and the nationals of these other States, 
against the illicit acts carried out or about to be perpetrated by 
47 See John B. Bellinger, Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism, conference given at 
the London School of Economics, 31 October 2006, available at: http://www2.lse.
ac.uk/PublicEvents/pdf/20061031_JohnBellinger.pdf.
48 Yoram Dinstein, ‘Comments on the Presentations by Nico Kirsch and Carsten 
Stahn’, in: Walter Christian, et al. (eds), Terrorism as a Challenge for National and 
International Law: Security versus Liberty?, Heidelberg, Springer, 2004, at 920; 
Michael Byers, ‘Not yet havoc: geopolitical change and the international rules 
on military force’, Review of International Studies, vol. 31, supplement, 2005, at 58.
49 Roberto Ago, ‘Fourth Report on State Responsibility, The internationally wrongful 
act of the State, source of international responsibility’, Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, Vol. II, 
1972, at 119-120, para. 135 (theory rejected by Ago).
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individuals, when these acts are conceived, prepared and/or car-
ried out within its territory or under its jurisdiction50.
 It is worth noting that the obligation of vigilance is not absolute. 
It is an obligation of conduct and not of result51. The host State 
– Syria, for instance – is only required to employ all means 
reasonably available to prevent or repress non-state actors’ 
conduct. When doing so, the host State fulfils its obligation of 
vigilance and cannot be accused of tolerating or acquiescing to 
the terrorist activities, even if it is not able to efficiently pre-
vent or repress such activities52. Contrariwise, in the event 
Syria is able but unwilling to take measures against ISIL it 
would breach its obligation of due diligence.
ii. A fundamental difference between terrorists ‘conduct and states’ 
conduct
 It is essential to understand that a violation of the obligation 
of due diligence by Syria doesn’t at all imply that the country 
engages its international responsibility for the injurious conduct 
of ISIL. Indeed, acts committed by private individuals acting as 
such cannot be considered as acts of the State and therefore the 
latter is not held responsible for the acts of the formers53. Nev-
ertheless, actions of private individuals might reveal the exist-
ence of an internationally wrongful act – an action or omission 
of organs of the State –, and it is that very wrongful act which 
entails the international responsibility of the State.
 The acts of individuals are described as ‘catalysts’, and what 
is attributed to the State and might involve its international re-
50 Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, ‘The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of Inter-
national Responsibility of States’, GYIL, vol. 35, 1992, at 34 ff.; François Dubuis-
son, ‘Vers un renforcement des obligations de diligence en matière de lutte contre le 
terrorisme?’, in: Karine Bannelier, et al. (ed. by), Le Droit international face au ter-
rorisme, CEDIN-Paris I, Pedone, Cahiers internationaux num. 17, 2002, at 141-157.
51 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 2007, para. 430 [hereinafter Genocide Convention case].
52 See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of 
the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, para. 301; Genocide Convention 
case, supra note 51, para. 430.
53 Roberto Ago, supra note 49, at 96, para. 63.
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sponsibility are not the catalysts per se but what is revealed 
by the catalysts54. In the context of the fight against terrorism, 
the catalysts – i.e. the conduct of terrorists acting as private in-
dividuals – might highlight the violation of the due diligence 
obligation by the State in whose territory terrorist actions are 
conceived and prepared, i.e. the violation of the duty to prevent 
terrorist attacks and/or to punish their acts injurious to the other 
States. Such a breach arises notably when the host State uses 
indirect force, examples of which are listed in the annex to Reso-
lution 2625 (XXV) of the General Assembly: organizing, assist-
ing in terrorists acts in another State, acquiescing in organized 
activities within its territory, etc.
 When infringing its due diligence obligation, the host State en-
gages its international responsibility towards other States and is 
required to cease the wrongful conduct and to make full repara-
tion for the injury caused55. For its part, the targeted State has 
the right to take countermeasures against the host State in 
order to induce the latter to comply with its international 
obligations56 – for example the obligation not to infringe the 
principle prohibiting the use of force embodied in Article 2, 
paragraph 4, of the UN Charter and referred to in the an-
nex to Resolution 2625 (XXV). However, the targeted State 
is not allowed to unilaterally use armed force against the host 
State and to invoke self-defense, as the acts attributed to that 
latter State (i.e. assisting, acquiescing, etc.) do not constitute an 
armed attack but merely an indirect use of force57.
2. The conditions of implementation of the right of self-defense
The existence of an armed attack is a necessary condition, but not a 
sufficient one, for authorizing a State to use force in self-defense. The 
implementation of that right requires that the victim States also com-
ply with three other “essential conditions for the admissibility of the 
54 Ibid., at 123, para. 140.
55 See ILC Articles, supra note 20, in particular Arts. 28, 30 and 31.
56 Ibid., Art. 49.
57 Nicaragua case, supra note 34, para. 191.
436 Volume 12 Number 4 July 2015
Jurnal Hukum Internasional
plea of self-defence in a given case”58: the customary59 requirements of 
necessity, proportionality and immediacy. Before analyzing the condi-
tion of immediacy, it is important to determine the exact purpose of 
self-defense, because the compliance of the action taken in self-defense 
with the requirements of the necessity, proportionality and immediacy 
is appreciated in light of this purpose.
a. The purpose of an action in self-defense
 Operation Enduring Freedom and the recent airstrikes in Syria have 
been justified by the desire to prevent and deter future terrorist at-
tacks. The US Permanent Representative to the United Nations de-
clared for example: “In response to [the 9/11 terrorist] attacks, and 
in accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective 
self-defence, United States armed forces have initiated actions 
designed to prevent and deter further attacks on the United 
States.”60 In fact, what the intervening States called self-defense is 
nothing more than the implementation of the nineteenth century 
concept of self-help (known also as self- preservation or self-
protection) that could be invoked in many differing situations such 
as preventing or deterring non-state actors from launching terrorist 
attacks61. However, since the 1930s the purpose of the right of self-
defense has been limited to one of halting and repelling an armed 
attack62.
 Today, the very large majority of States and scholars agree that the 
only admissible purpose of a military operation launched in self-
defense is to halt and/or to repel an armed attack63. Roberto Ago, 
58 Roberto Ago, supra note 44, para. 119.
59 Nicaragua case, supra note 34, para. 176.
60 UN Doc. S/2001/946, 7 October 2001. See also UN Doc. S/2001/947.
61 See Humphrey Waldock, supra note 10, at 463-464; Ian Brownlie, supra note 2, at 
43.
62 See the in-depth research conducted by Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Les réactions 
décentralisées à l’illicite: des contre-mesures à la légitime défense, Paris, LGDJ, 
1990, at 297
63 See notably Antonio Cassese, ‘Article 51’, in: Jean-Pierre Cot, Alain Pellet (dir.), 
La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire article par article, Paris, Economica, 
2nd ed., 1991, at 775; Oscar Schachter, ‘The Right of States to Use Armed Force’, 
Mich.L.Rev., vol. 82, num. 5 & 6, 1984, at 254; Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and 
Process: International Law and How We Use It, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, 
at 232; Judith Gardam, ‘Necessity and Proportionality in Jus ad Bellum and Jus 
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for example, underscored that “the objective to be achieved by the 
conduct in question [i.e. self-defense], its raison d’être, is neces-
sarily that of repelling an attack and preventing it from succeeding, 
and nothing else”64. The term ‘preventing it from succeeding’ must 
be interpreted as meaning ‘defeating an ongoing armed attack’65.
 It is true that for many years now, some scholars and States66 
have invoked other more controversial purposes for the right of 
self-defense. According to those scholars, actions in self-defense 
would be also authorized to prevent attacks and deter attackers from 
launching operations in the future67. This stretching out of the self-
defense’s purpose has often been invoked in the context of the war 
against terrorism, notably because terrorist operations are so sudden 
and sporadic that it is therefore much easier to prevent or repel ter-
rorist attacks than to halt ongoing ones. However, it must be stressed 
that such a doctrine has never been confirmed by the actual State 
practice which has never been neither constant nor uniform – condi-
tions for the existence of a new customary rule68 – with regard to that 
matter.
b. The condition of immediacy
 The condition of immediacy is closely linked to the objective of 
self-defense. The former raises the question of when can an ac-
tion in self-defense be launched: before, during or after an armed 
in Bello’, in: Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Philippe Sands (ed.), International 
Law, The International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 1999, at 280
64 Roberto Ago, supra note 44, at 69, para. 119.
65 See Luigi Condorelli, ‘Les attentats du 11 septembre et leurs suites: où va le droit 
international?’, RGDIP, t. 105, 2001, at 838.
66 Eric Corthay, supra note 3, at 241-250.
67 See notably Louis Henkin, ‘The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy’, in: Henkin 
Louis, et. al. (ed.), Right v. Might, International Law and the Use of Force, New 
York, London, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1989, at 45; Oscar Schachter, In-
ternational Law in Theory and Practice, Dordrecht, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Pub-
lishers, 1991, at 154; Jost Delbrück, ‘The Fight Against Terrorism: Self-Defense or 
Collective Security as International Police Action? Some Comments on the Interna-
tional Legal Implications of the ‘War Against Terrorism’’, GYIL, vol. 44, 2001, at 17.
68 For the conditions relating to the existence of a new customary rule, see Colombi-
an-Peruvian Asylum Case, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1950, notably at 277; Continental 
Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 3 June 1985, ICJ Reports 1985, 
para. 27.
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attack? Operation Enduring Freedom and the air campaign in 
Syria have been justified by the right of anticipatory self-defense 
(i.e. preventing further attacks)69. However, an interpretation of the 
letter and spirit of Article 51, the study of actual State practice sub-
sequent to the adoption of the Charter, as well as the reading of the 
International Court of Justice’s decisions, have led to the conclu-
sion that the alleged right of anticipatory self- defense has no place 
in international law to date.
 Article 51 of the UN Charter provides that “[n]othing in the present 
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs”70. A textual interpretation 
of the provision leads to a rejection of the doctrine of anticipatory 
self- defense. Indeed, the wording ‘if an armed attack occurs’ is 
clear and does not mean ‘if the threat of an armed attack occurs’. 
In other words, and according to the canon expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius, the condition stated in Article 51 – the existence of 
an ongoing armed attack – is the only condition admitted for the 
exercise of the right of self-defense71. In addition, and following a 
purposive interpretation of the UN Charter, one can point out that 
the will of those who drafted the Charter was to limit as much as 
possible the right for States to use force in their international rela-
tions, and not to recognize a right of self-protection that could be 
implemented every time they were threatened72.
 It is a priori not impossible that, between 1945 and today, States 
have expansively interpreted Article 51 and considered that nowa-
days the said provision authorizes States to use force in anticipa-
tion of an attack. In that case, actual State practice would have given 
rise to a new customary law of anticipatory self-defense. This being 
69 The operation in Syria is also carried out to eliminate continuing attacks from ISIL 
against Iraq. See letter of the US Permanent Representative, supra note 32.
70 Emphasis added.
71 See Josef L. Kunz, supra note 38, at 878; Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United 
Nations. A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems, London, Stevens, 1950, 
at 797. Contra Myres S. McDougal, ‘The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-De-
fense’, AJIL, vol. 57, num. 3, 1963, at 600.
72 Louis Henkin, supra note 8, at 142; Albrecht Randelzhofer, ‘Article 51’, in: Bruno 
Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary, vol. I, Munich, C. 
H. Beck, 2002, at 803.
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said, in order for a new customary law to emerge, actual practice 
of “the international community of States as a whole”73, – a prac-
tice that reflects their opinio juris – must have been constant and 
uniform. However, the examination of actual State practice leads to 
the conclusion that the requirements of constancy and uniformity 
have not (yet) been met. Indeed, since 1945, the operations jus-
tified by a right of self-defense in anticipation of terrorist attacks 
show a radical division between States74. Few of them accepted a 
legal right of anticipatory self-defense. Many qualified the military 
operations as notably being aggressions75 or acts of aggression76. 
The same division exists with regard to Operation Enduring Free-
dom. Although many States remained silent on the legality of the 
operation – and it is therefore not easy to determine whether such a 
silence was the expression of their approbation or, on the contrary, 
of their condemnation of the operation – some States77 and inter-
national organizations78 claimed that the operation was justified by 
the right of self-defense, while a few States openly qualified the 
joint military operation as an aggression or in violation of the Af-
ghan sovereignty79. This brief study of State practice subsequent to 
the adoption of the UN Charter seems to show that States are divid-
ed on the question of whether the right of anticipatory self-defense 
has a place in international law. Therefore, as the actual practice of 
the international community of States as a whole is not uniform, as 
well as not constant – and even if the international community as a 
73 See Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, available at:
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.
74 See Eric Corthay, supra note 3, at 241-250.
75 With regard to Operation Litani (1978), see UN Docs. S/PV.2071, 2072 and 2073.
76 It was notably the case during the 1975 Israeli raid against Palestinian camps in 
Lebanon, see UN Docs. S/PV.1859, 1860, 1861, 1862.
77 See notably Commonwealth of Dominica, UN Doc. A/56/PV.51, 13 November 
2001, at 2; Republic of Moldova, UN Doc. A/56/PV.56, 16 November 2001, at 10; 
Seychelles, UN Doc. A/56/PV.56, at 32; France, UN Doc. S/PV.4413, 12 November 
2001, at 7; Norway, UN Doc. S/PV.4413, at 10.
78 NATO invoked Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington (collective self-defense), 
‘Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson’, Press Release 138, 8 Oc-
tober 2001; European Union, UN Doc. A/56/PV.44, 10 November 2001, at 37.
79 See Cuba, UN Doc. A/56/PV.13, 1st October 2001; Iraq, UN Doc. A/56/PV.51, 13 
November 2001; North Korea, UN Doc. A/56/PV.52, 14 November 2001.
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whole demonstrated an approbation of the operation in Syria, this 
would not mean that the criteria of constancy is met – it may be 
concluded that the right of anticipatory self- defense does not exist 
in general international law.
 The conclusions mentioned above are confirmed by judicial deci-
sions80. In the Oil Platforms case, whose judgment was rendered 
after the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Court held: 
“in order to establish that it was legally justified in attacking the Ira-
nian platforms in exercise of the right of individual self-defence, the 
United States has to show that attacks had been made upon it for 
which Iran was responsible; and that those attacks were of such a 
nature as to be qualified as “armed attacks” within the meaning of 
that expression in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and as 
understood in customary law on the use of force”81. Therefore, the 
Court states that the implementation of the right of self- defense re-
quires the existence of an armed attack, and not only the existence 
of a threat of attack; a condition not fulfilled in the case of Operation 
Enduring Freedom.
B. THE SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY
Terrorism is a scourge that the international community attempts 
to prevent and eradicate. Nevertheless, as mentioned supra, given that 
most of the terrorist attacks are sudden, sporadic and not attributed to a 
State, it is very difficult to justify a military counter-terrorism opera-
tion through the right of self-defense. If States consider it necessary to 
use force against terrorists, and for their operations to be legal, it would 
be then preferable for them to look for and apply the second exception 
to the principle prohibiting the use of force: an authorization by the 
Security Council to use armed force. Their military operations would 
be consequently an application of the mechanism of collective security 
– at least of its spirit if not of its letter– provided for by the Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter.
Collective security can be defined as a system in which, when 
peace and security of a State are undermined or about to be affected, 
80 See also Nicaragua case, supra note 34, paras. 176, 195 and 232.
81 Oil Platforms case, supra note 34, para. 51 (emphasis added).
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and this breach has or leads to a risk of repercussions at the regional 
or international level, so other Members of the UN Organization unite 
and join forces against the peace-breaker in order to maintain or restore 
peace and security. In 1945, the drafters of the Charter wanted the 
system of collective security to be based on a complete centralization 
of the legitimate use of force82. In other words, collective enforcement 
actions had to be decided and directed by a central organ of the Orga-
nization, namely the Security Council which is sometimes qualified 
as “the embodiement of the collective”83.
Member States have given a number of powers to the Security Coun-
cil, in particular those mentioned under Chapter VII. This Chapter, enti-
tled “Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, 
and acts of aggression”, is the very heart of the system of collective se-
curity. Chapter VII starts with Article 39 that provides: “[t]he Security 
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 
42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” This provi-
sion, sometimes defined as the “single most important provision of the 
Charter”84, may be considered as the cornerstone of the system of col-
lective security in the sense that it contains a summary of the powers 
given to the Security Council and necessary for the implementation of 
the mechanism of collective security: to determine the existence of a 
specific situation first, and then to decide what measures to take in 
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
1. The power of determination
According to Article 39 of the UN Charter, “[t]he Security Coun-
cil shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression”. Before examining how the Security 
Council qualifies terrorism and terrorist-related behaviors, it seems im-
portant to clarify the scope of the power of determination.
82 Hans Kelsen, supra note 38, at 784-785.
83 Hilary Charlesworth, ‘The Inadequacy of ‘Collective Security’’, Finnish Y.B. Int’l 
L., vol. 9, 1998, at 39. See also Article 24, paragraph 1, of the UN Charter.
84 U.S. Secretary of State, Charter of the United Nations : Report to the President 
on the Results of the San Francisco Conference by the Chairman of the United 
States Delegation, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1945, at 90-91.
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a. General observations
 First of all, the Security Council’s power consisting of determining 
whether a threat to, or a breach of, the peace, or an act of aggression 
exists is the condition sine qua non required for the adoption, then, 
of military or non military enforcement measures under Articles 
41 and 4285. Moreover, the Council cannot delegate this power to 
any other entity, be it a State or an international organization86. Fur-
thermore, as Article 39 empowers but does not oblige the Security 
Council to act, the Council is under no obligation to make a de-
termination vis-à-vis a concrete situation, even if on the basis of 
its past practice the said situation could be objectively and clearly 
qualified as a threat to, or a breach of, the peace, or an act of aggres-
sion87. Also, as evidenced infra, the determination of a threat to the 
peace does not require the prior existence of a breach of the law by 
a State. In other words, to be qualified as such, a threat to the peace 
must not necessarily be the result of the wrongful act of a State88.
 Finally, it is worth noting that the Security Council’s power of de-
termination is subject to certain limitations. Indeed, in the Tadic 
case, the Appeal Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia declared: “The Security Council is an 
organ of an international organization, established by a treaty which 
serves as a constitutional framework for that organization. The Se-
curity Council is thus subjected to certain constitutional limitations, 
however broad its powers under the constitution may be”.89 As an 
example of constitutional limitations, one may notably mention the 
obligation for the Security Council, and therefore for its Members, 
85 Jean Combacau, ‘Le Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies : résurrec-
tion ou métamorphose?’, in : Rafâa Ben Achour, Slim Laghmani, Les nouveaux 
aspects du droit international, Rencontres internationales de la Faculté des sciences 
juridiques, politiques et sociales de Tunis, colloque des 14, 15 et 16 avril 1994, Paris, 
Pedone, 1994, at 144-145.
86 Danesh Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security, 
The Delegation by the UN Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers, Oxford, Ox-
ford University Press, 1999, at 33.
87 Eric Corthay, supra note 3, at 354.
88 See for example Resolution 1440 (2002) related to the act of taking hostages in 
Moscow by non-state actors.
89 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeals Chamber, IT-94-1-AR72, 2 October 1995, para. 
28.
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to “act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
Nations”.90
b. Terrorism and the “threat to the peace”
 Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Security Council has been 
qualifying terrorism only as the first of the three cases mentioned 
in Article 39, namely a threat to the peace. This notion needs 
to be defined. Peace may be considered as a state of stability and 
order91. The state of peace is thus threatened when a destabilizing 
and potentially explosive situation emerges. In the field of inter-
national relations, it may be asserted that a threat to the peace is 
the resultant of a destabilization of the international security. Since 
1945, such a destabilization has taken different forms. According to 
the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, threats 
to international security are constituted by “[a]ny event or process 
that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances and 
undermines States as the basic unit of the international system”.92 
Terrorism has been identified as such a ‘event or process’.93
 It is only progressively that the Security Council has realized that 
terrorism impinges on international peace and security. The first 
relevant resolutions did not address the issue of terrorism in general 
but merely some of its modus operandi, such as the taking of hos-
tages or hijackings.94 Then, since 1992, the Security Council quali-
fies the acts of ‘international terrorism’ as threats to the international 
90 Article 24, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. This obligation was also pointed out 
in Tadic case, para. 29. On the principle of good faith, see Eric Corthay, supra note 
3, at 359-367.
91 Emmerich De Vattel, The Law of Nations; or Principles of the Law of Nature, Ap-
plied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, (ed. by Joseph Chitty), 
Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson, 1853, Book II, Chap. IV, para. 1.
92 A more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and
Change, UN Doc. A/59/565, 2 December 2004, at 12.
93 Other clusters of threats identified by the High-level Panel are economic and social 
threats, including poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation; inter-
State conflict; internal conflict, including civil war,
genocide and other large-scale atrocities; nuclear, radiological, chemical and biologi-
cal weapons; and
transnational organized crime.
94 See for example Resolution 579 (1985).
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peace and security.95 Finally, from 2003 onwards, the Council con-
tinuously reaffirms that ‘terrorism’, in all its forms and manifesta-
tion, – and no longer merely ‘international’ terrorism – constitutes 
one of the most serious threats to international peace and security.96 
Moreover, in parallel, the Security Council constantly reaffirms that 
it is also crucial for the maintenance of international peace and 
security to combat and defeat terrorism,97 this having to be done 
in accordance with the UN Charter and international law, includ-
ing applicable international human rights, refugee and humanitarian 
law.98 An in-depth examination of the Security Council’s practice 
following the perpetration of terrorist acts reveals that at least four 
different terrorist-related situations have been qualified as a threat 
to international peace and security: primo, the non-compliance by 
a government with the requests set out by the Security Council in 
a previous resolution99; secondo, the terrorist acts per se100; tertio, 
the terrorist acts and their implications101; and quatro, some terrorist 
95 See Resolution 731 (1992) related to the Lockerbie bombing, Resolution 1373 
(2001), Resolution 1377 (2001), Resolution 1438 (2002) related to Bali bombings, 
Resolution 1440 (2002) related to the hostage-taking terrorist attack in Moscow, 
Resolution 1450 (2002) related to the bombing at the Paradise Hotel in Kenya and
the attempted missile attack on Arkia Israeli Airlines flight 582.
96 See Resolutions 1530 (2004), 1535 (2004), 1566 (2004), 1611 (2005), 1617 
(2005), 1618 (2005), 1624 (2005), 1735 (2006), 1787 (2007), 1805 (2008), 1822 
(2008), 1904 (2009), 1963 (2010), 1989 (2011), 2083 (2012), 2129 (2013), 2133 
(2014), 2161 (2014), and 2170 (2014).
97 See notably Resolutions 731 (1992), 748 (1992), 1044 (1996), 1054 (1996), 1189 
(1998), 1214 (1998), 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), 2083 (2012), 2129 (2013), 2133 
(2014), 2161 (2014), and 2170 (2014).
98 See for example Resolutions 1269 (1999), 1438 (2002), 1440 (2002), 1450 (2002), 
1455 (2003), 1530 (2004), 1566 (2004), 1611 (2005), 1618 (2005), 1624 (2005), 
1822 (2008), 1988 (2011), 1989 (2011), 2083 (2012), 2161 (2014), and 2170 (2014)
99 See Resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992) related to the Lockerbie bombing, 
Resolution 1044 (1996) and 1054 (1996) related to the assassination attempt of Presi-
dent Mubarak.
100 See for example Resolution 1438 (2002) related to Bali bombings, Resolution 
1450 (2002) related to the bombing at the Paradise Hotel in Kenya, Resolution 1530 
(2004) related to Madrid bombings, Resolution 1611 (2005) related to London bomb-
ings.
101 See Resolution 1644 (2005) related to the bombing that killed former Lebanese 
Prime Minister Hariri and the subsequent risk of destabilization of the country
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groups and those associated with them.102
2. The authorization to use force
according to Article 39, after having determined the existence of a 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, the Secu-
rity Council shall “decide what measures shall be taken in accordance 
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace 
and security”. While Article 41 refers to non-military enforcement mea-
sures, Article 42 is related to military enforcement ones. The following 
part focuses on the implementation of military measures and aims at 
describing the original scheme set out in the Chapter VII in 1945 
before analyzing the new practice developed by the Security Council 
mainly since the end of the Cold War. It will be shown that under the 
new practice established by the Council at least two large military op-
erations mandated to counter terrorism have been constituted.
a. From a centralized process to decentralized operations 
 The founding fathers of the UN Charter had designed a very cen-
tralized mechanism for the implementation of military enforcement 
measures. However, this original mechanism was never implement-
ed as such and therefore the Security Council decided to develop 
a new practice, in conformity with the spirit of the Chapter VII, 
which consisted of delegating its enforcement powers to Member 
States.
i. The scheme set out in chapter VII
 Article 42 of the UN Charter provides: “Should the Securi-
ty Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may 
take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be neces-
sary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” 
The implementation of such an action is set out in the Articles 
which follow. These provisions do not envisage the establish-
ment of ‘an international army’ but stipulate that “[a]ll Members 
of the United Nations […] undertake to make available to the 
Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special 
agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facili-
102 See for example Resolutions 1617 (2005), 1989 (2011) and 2083 (2012) related to 
Al-Qaida and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with it.
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ties […] necessary for the purpose of maintaining international 
peace and security.” (Art. 43, para. 1). These agreements shall 
be concluded between the Security Council and UN Members 
and aim to govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree 
of readiness and general location and the nature of the facilities 
and assistance to be provided (Art. 43, paras. 2 and 3). The 
Security Council shall exercise strong command and control 
over the national troops made available to it. Indeed, assisted 
and advised by a Military Staff Committee, the Council shall 
determine the strength and degree of readiness of the contin-
gents, their employment, plans for their combined action, the 
regulation of armaments and possible disarmament (Arts. 45 
to 47). Thus, it is clear that Chapter VII set out a very central-
ized process for combined international enforcement measures, 
when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.
ii. A new practice: the authorization to use armed forced
 It is important to note that the original collective security 
scheme explained supra has never been implemented as such. 
Due to political and ideological divergences, the special agree-
ments mentioned under Article 43 have never been concluded, 
and without these agreements and multinational contingents un-
der its command and control the Security Council is obviously 
not able to take military action – stricto sensu – as may be nec-
essary. Therefore, for the Security Council the alternative was as 
follows: either to renounce the idea of taking military operation 
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and secu-
rity, or to develop and implement a new practice in conformity 
with the spirit – and not with the letter – of the Chapter VII, a 
practice progressively accepted by the international communi-
ty.103 The Council chose the second option. Indeed, it has often 
authorized Member States or regional arrangements to use force 
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security, 
103 Robert Kolb, Ius contra bellum, Le droit international relatif au maintien de la 
paix, Helbing Lichtenhahn, Bâle, Bruylant, Bruxelle, 2003, at 93. In the opinion of 
the present writer, the authority of the Security Council to authorize the use of armed 
force by States is not founded on Article 42 but rather on the theory of implied pow-
ers, see Eric Corthay, supra note 3, at 381-385.
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especially since the end of the Cold War. In other words, the 
Security Council has often transferred or delegated to States 
some of its discretionary enforcement powers under Chapter 
VII.104 This process of delegation introduces an element of de-
centralization in the system of collective security in the sense 
that now States decide on a voluntary basis whether, to which 
degree and for how long, they will take the necessary measures 
called for by the Council.105
iii. Two types of joint military operations 
 The Security Council’s practice authorizing States to use force 
has led to the creation of two different types of military opera-
tions: the peace operations (blue helmets) and the multination-
al operations. In the context of the fight against terrorism one 
could mention at least two combined military operations for 
which the Security Council has authorized States to use force: 
the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization 
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the International Security As-
sistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
 MINUSMA was established by Resolution 2100 (2013)106 
adopted under Chapter VII. This is an example of hybrid peace 
operations which are defined by Tardy as “operations that bring 
together two or more international actors that operate simul-
taneously or sequentially and the activities of which imply a 
certain degree of inter institutional cooperation”.107 The mis-
sion is comprised of more than ten thousand military person-
nel and around one thousand five hundred police personnel 
from more than thirty countries. Its mandate is in essence to 
support the political process in Mali and to carry out a number 
of security-related stabilization tasks.108 The Mission in Mali is 
104 Danesh Sarooshi, supra note 86, at 13.
105 Jochen Abraham Frowein, Nico Krisch, ‘Article 42’, in : Simma Bruno (ed.), 
The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary, 2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, vol. I, 2002, at 756.
106 Resolution 2165 (2014) extends the mandate of MINUSMA until 30 June 2015.
107 Tierry Tardy, ‘Hybrid Peace Operations’, Global Governance, vol. 20, num. 1, Jan.-
Mar. 2014, at 97
108 For more information, see MINUSMA, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peace-
keeping/missions/minusma/.
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not deployed to conduct offensive counter- terrorism operations 
because “[t]he United Nations is not configured to oversee such 
operations at a strategic level, nor are its peacekeepers typically 
trained, equipped or experienced in this kind of operations”.109 
With regard to the threat posed by terrorists and other groups, 
MINUSMA is primarily a mission of stabilization and protec-
tion: stabilization of key population centres and support for 
the reestablishment of State authority throughout the country, 
protection of civilians and UN personnel, support for humani-
tarian assistance and protection of cultural and historical sites.110 
It operates with the support of an EU training mission and previ-
ously with the French Operation Serval which itself counted on 
EU countries for notably in-air refueling activities.
 ISAF has been established by Resolution 1386 (2001) adopted 
under Chapter VII. Indeed, in December 20, the Security Coun-
cil “[a]uthorizes […] the establishment […] of an International 
Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Author-
ity in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding 
areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the person-
nel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment”. 
Since August 2003, NATO assumed leadership of the ISAF op-
eration and has been responsible for the command, coordination 
and planning of the force. In October 2003, Resolution 1510 
extended ISAF’s mandate to cover the whole of Afghanistan. 
As of today, around forty eight nations provide more than forty 
thousand military personnel to ISAF.111 The mission of ISAF 
is multi-facetted and notably consists of assisting the Afghan 
Government in the establishment of a secure and stable envi-
ronment, strengthening the institutions, supporting the growth 
in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forc-
es (ANSF), supporting reconstruction and development in the 
country, and supporting humanitarian assistance. Moreover, and 
although this is first and foremost the mission of the Coalition 
109 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2013/189, 
para. 70.
110 See Resolution 2100 (2013) and 2165 (2014).
111 See Troop numbers and contributions, available at: http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-
numbers-and- contributions/index.php.
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(i.e. Operation Enduring Freedom), ISAF, together with ANSF, 
also carry out combat operations against the Taliban and other 
terrorist groups.112
 It should be noted that in both cases – and this is what happens in 
most of the situations113– the host States (Mali and Afghanistan) 
had already consented to the military operations before the 
adoption of the Resolutions 1386 (2001) and 2100 (2013).114 
A priori such consents are sufficient to consider the operations 
as lawful. However, adopting a resolution serves several pur-
poses. Primo, as explained by Corten, “the Security Council 
tends, though, to make military action independently of the 
existence, and also of the scope, of the State’s consent. The 
very purpose of this type of resolution is to confer extended and 
autonomous power on the intervening force that is dependent 
solely on the will of the Security Council itself.”115 Secondo, 
sometimes the host State itself requests the Security Council to 
consider authorizing the deployment of a UN mandated force, 
because the presence of foreign troops under an impartial UN 
mandate would be easier to accept for local populations used to 
imperialist invasions.116
b. The letter of the resolutions authorizing the use of force
 The authorization given to States to use armed force must fall 
under a decision of the Security Council. The power to use 
force is not transferred to States as long as the Council has not 
clearly and formally decided so. This requirement is due to the 
fact that a Security Council’s authorization is an exception to 
the principle prohibiting the use of force, and it should and must 
112 See for example ‘Afghan, ISAF forces launch Operation Spin Ghar’, press re-
lease 2007-689, available at: http://www.nato.int.
113 See Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, Oxford, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2004, at 253
114 Regarding the consent given by Afghanistan to the deployment of ISAF, see 
Annex to the letter dated 19 December 2001 from the Permanent Representative 
of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, UN Doc. S/2001/1223.
115 Olivier Corten, supra note 6, at 314.
116 See Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-estab-
lishment of permanent government institutions (Bonn Agreement on Afghanistan), 
UN Doc. S/2001/1154, dated 5 December 2001.
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stay that way. An authorization, for example, must not be pre-
sumed from a resolution by which the Council only determines 
the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression.117 The non-observance of this requirement of 
clarity and formalism could lead to a multiplication of military 
operations and therefore could undermine the system of collec-
tive security.118
 The Security Council’s practice consisting of authorizing States 
to use force is varied. Most of the time, the resolutions do not 
lay down expressis verbis the authorization to resort ‘to armed 
force’, but only stipulates that States are authorized to take ‘all 
necessary measures’ or ‘all necessary means’ to fulfill the Coun-
cil’s mandate. For example, in paragraph 3 of Resolution 1386 
(2001), the Security Council “[a]uthorizes the Member States 
participating in the International Security Assistance Force to 
take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate”. As well, in 
paragraph 12 of Resolution 2164 (2014), the Council “[a]uthor-
izes MINUSMA to take all necessary means to carry out its 
mandate”. At first glance, a brief examination of State practice is 
sufficient to conclude that these wordings usually imply a resort 
to military action. However, in order to be absolutely certain 
that the will of the Council is to authorize the resort to armed 
force, a case by case examination of the debates and declarations 
of States surrounding each resolution needs to be conducted.119
 Once engaged in theater, it is obvious that UN mandated forc-
es must respect and apply the rules of international law, such 
as the human rights and the international humanitarian law.120 
They must also respect the terms of the mandate decided by the 
Security Council in its resolutions and are only authorized to 
117 Eric Corthay, supra note 3, at 387.
118 Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, ‘L’autorisation par la Conseil de Sécurité de recourir 
a la force : une tentative d’évaluation’, Collected Courses…, t. 106, num. 1, 2002, 
at 47.
119 Olivier Corten, supra note 6, at 327.
120 See notably Alexandre Faite, Jérémie Labbé Grenier (ed.), Expert Meeting on 
Multinational Peace Operations, Applicability of International Humanitarian Law 
and International Human Rights Law to UN Mandated Forces, Geneva, 11-12 De-
cember 2003, ICRC, October 2004, 93 p.
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take action within the framework established by the mandate. 
Although the Security Council authorizes States to use ‘all’ nec-
essary means or measures, it is worth mentioning that States 
have no unconditional right to use force. On the contrary, they 
have merely the right to use force that is necessary to fulfill the 
mandate established by the Council. Therefore, under the jus 
contra bellum, the legality of a military measure depends upon 
the objectives of the mandate. Any other military action would 
be considered as a violation of the principle prohibiting the use 
of force.
IV. CONCLUSION
From the standpoint of international law, military operations in the 
context of the fight against terrorism – by one State or by a coalition 
of States – are subject to the very strict rules of the jus contra bellum, 
as other operations in other contexts are as well. In other words, 
there is no lex specialis that would merely apply to the war against ter-
rorism. Lawful or not, the relevance and efficiency of military opera-
tions launched in the context of the fight against terrorism need to be 
questioned. When the objective or mandate includes missions of stabi-
lization, protection, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, a real 
chance for restoring and maintaining peace and security exists. How-
ever, when the objective or mandate of the operation is limited to tar-
geting and destroying terrorist capabilities, its degree of effectiveness, 
in the middle or long run, is more debatable. Too often, those 
targeted and limited operations cause an escalation of violence and 
a spiral of reprisals. Armed violence induces more terrorism, and both 
of them risk generating innocent victims, a burning sense of injustice 
and a dangerous grudge.
As terrorism is a universal and complex scourge, the international 
community has wisely recognized and stressed that it “can only be de-
feated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the active 
participation and collaboration of all States, and international and region-
al organizations to impede, impair, isolate and incapacitate the terrorist 
threat”.121 Necessary collective and multidimensional actions include, but 
121 See for example Resolution 2170 (2014).
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are not limited to, the elimination of ethnic and religious discriminations, 
the establishment of the rule of law, the promotion of tolerance and dia-
logue among civilizations, information sharing, as well as judicial coop-
eration.122 These measures are a huge undertaking in that they require a 
sustainable effort over many years, measures however that remain vital 
and indispensable. Last but not least, in order to succeed in that mission, 
to avoid misunderstandings and mitigate the risks of abuse, it is also es-
sential that the international community continues to commit all effort to 
the adoption of a comprehensive convention which contains a clear and 
universally accepted definition of terrorism.
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